Ideas from 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?' by E.J. Lowe [2013], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Mind' (ed/tr -) [- ,]].

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2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence

16539

A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle

16540

Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse

16548

An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right

2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition

16549

Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

16545

The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct

16546

The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition

16551

Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory

16542

Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences

16552

If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity

16533

Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity

16531

'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility

16532

'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty'

10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence

16543

If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary

16544

Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds

16538

We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences

12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition

16534

'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously

18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts

16535

A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist

19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference

16550

Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism

16547

H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine